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lease for longer periods without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior;
and any lease not permitted by the testrictions was to be absolutely void. The
allottee made leases of his lands, without approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, to take effect six months later, at the expiration of an existing lease.
A State statute required leases of Indian land made invalid by act of Congress,
to be treated as tenancies at will for purpose of determining compensation
which an allottee could recover from the lessee for use of the land.
Held, the leases made by Bunch to take effect in the future were abso-
lutely void under the act of Congress, and that the State statute giving to them
the effect of tenancies at will was invalid because in conflict with the act of
Congress.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE DENYING ALIEN RIGHT TO
OWN LAND DOES NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF PROPERTY WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OR DENY EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS.
Terrace v. Thompson (U. S. Sup.), Adv. Ops. Dec. 1, 1923, p. 35:
This suit is brought against the attorney-general of the State of Wash-
ington to enjoin him from enforcing the anti-alien land law of that State. By
the terms of that law, aliens who have not made a bona fide declaration of an
intention to become citizens of the United States are not permitted to own
or lease land for agricultural purposes, and citizens of the United States who
knowingly make conveyances or leases to such aliens are deemed guilty of a
high misdemeanor.
It is alleged that the statute is in conflict with the due process and equal
protection clauses of the 14th Amendment, and with the treaty between the
United States and Japan (37 Stat. at L. 1504). The court held:
That the 14th Amendment does not take from the States the right to make
police regulations, and that a State may make reasonable classification of
citizens and aliens for the purpose of legislation.
That each State has, in the absence of a treaty provision to the contrary,
power to deny aliens the right to own land within its borders.
That State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens, withholding
from them such a right, does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty
or property without due process of law.
That the classification of the statute, allowing aliens who have declared
an intention to become citizens the right to hold land, and denying such right
to those aliens who have not made such declaration does not violate the con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
That no right to own or lease agricultural land is conferred by a treaty
that the subject may lease land for residential or commercial purposes.
Porterfield v. Webb (U. S. Sup.), Adv. Ops. Dec. 1, 1923:
Suit against the attorney-general of the State of California to enjoin the
enforcement of the Alien Land Law of that State.
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REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS
The same objections are urged against the validity of this law as are
urged against the Washington Alien Land Law.
According to the terms of the California statute, the prohibited class is
made up of aliens who are not eligible for citizenship, while in Terrace v.
Thompson, supra, the prohibited class is made up of aliens who have not made
a declaration in good faith to become citizens. The latter class includes not
only ineligible aliens, but also all eligible aliens who have not made a bona fide
declaration for citizenship.
The court held that in the matter of classification, States have wide dis-
cretion, since each has its own problems based upon conditions existing there.
Accordingly, it was held that the failure of the California legislature to extend
the prohibited class to eligible aliens who have failed to declare their intention
to become citizens was not unreasonable or arbitrary.
HABEAS CORPUS--U. S. CIRCUIT JUDGES HAVE NO POWER TO
ISSUE-CANNOT BE USED AS WRIT OF ERROR.
Craig v. Hecht, U. S. Sup. Adv. Ops. Dec. 15, 1923:
Writ of certiorari to United States Circuit Court of Appeals, second cir-
cuit, to review a decree reversing an order of a United States Circuit Judge,
at chambers; directing the discharge of Charles Craig, Comptroller of New
York City, who had been committed to custody for contempt of court. The
alleged contempt was the writing and publishing a letter to a Public Service
Commissioner, wherein Craig assailed the United States District Judge because
of certain action taken in receivership proceedings then pending.
The United States District Attorney filed an information charging Craig
with criminal contempt under Sec. 268 of the Judicial Code. Upon hearing
the matter, the District Court (Judge Mayer) sentenced Craig to jail for sixty
days and committed him to the custody of the United States Marshal. Without
making any effort to appeal, Craig presented a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and final discharge to "Martin T. Manton, Circuit Judge of the United
States," who had been assigned to hold the district court. Upon hearing, Judge
Manton held that the district court had "exceeded its jurisdiction by an excess
of power in adjudging Craig guilty," and ordered him discharged.
From that ruling Circuit Judge Hough allowed an appeal to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that circuit judges, as such, are
without power to grant writs of habeas corpus, and therefore treated the cause
as determined by the district court to which Judge Manton had been assigned.
It held further that as habeas corpus proceedings cannot be used as a writ
of error, but must be limited to jurisdictional questions, the sole question before
Judge Manton was as to the jurisdiction of the district court in the original
proceeding, and concluded that the district court (Judge Mayer) had jurisdiction
of both offense and person, and reversed the order of discharge.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on all
points.
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